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Exclusionary Rule
I. INTRODUCrION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to all people
freedom from "unreasonable searches and seizures."' The precise scope of this
protection has long been a subject of considerable litigation and debate. Despite this
controversy several fourth amendment principles can be discerned.
Under ordinary circumstances an official desiring to conduct a search must first
obtain a warrant.2 The fourth amendment provides that "no Warrant shall issue, but
upon probable cause. . .. ,,3 For purposes of this Comment, it is sufficient to note
that probable cause is a relatively high evidentiary standard which "does not permit
obtaining a warrant to be casual or automatic, but at the same time is not so high that
warrants become virtually unobtainable. ' 4 Warrantless searches are permitted in
only a few specifically defined situations. 5 In cases in which no warrant is required,
the official involved ordinarily must have either probable cause6 or a reasonable
suspicion, 7 depending on the circumstances, before conducting a search. 8 Where
searches are permitted under the less stringent reasonable suspicion standard, the
1. U.S. Co-.rr. amend. IV. The amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
2. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762, reh'g
denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 528-29 (1967); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-98
(1958).
3. U.S. Cos.-r. amend. IV.
4. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IowA L. REv. 739, 744 (1974).
Although its definition has varied over time, Justice Brennan defines probable cause as follows:
Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within [the officials'] knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief" that a criminal offense had occurred and the evidence would be found in the suspected place.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 358 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, citing Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
5. Professors Hogan and Schwartz indicate that there are five major exceptions to the warrant requirement:
(1) when consent is given (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)); (2) when the object of the search
is in "plain view" (Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968)); (3) when conducted incident to a lawful
arrest (United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973)); (4) when exigent circumstances exist (Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970)); and (5) when in hot pursuit (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)).
Hogan & Schwartz, The Fourth Amendment and the Public Schools, 7 WnrrrER L. REv. 527,537 n.55 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Hogan & Schwartz].
6. See, e.g.. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, reh'g denied, 400 U.S. 856 (1970); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700-06
(1983); Pennsylvania v. Minims, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8. Situations exist in which neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion are needed. See, e.g., United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (routine stopping of a vehicle at a border for brief questioning); United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (when conducted incident to a lawful arrest); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543
(1968) (when consent is given).
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official involved may conduct only a limited, minimally intrusive search. 9 The
exclusionary rule operates as a mechanism to enforce fourth amendment rights insofar
as it bars the admission, in a criminal prosecution, of evidence which has been seized
in violation of these principles. 10
In New Jersey v. T.L. 0.,11 the United States Supreme Court determined, in part,
the extent to which public school officials are bound by the above fourth amendment
principles. The scope of the protection afforded schoolchildren by this decision has
sparked a fair amount of controversy and commentary.12 This Comment will briefly
outline and explain the Court's decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O. In addition, this
Comment will examine the propriety of the exclusionary rule as a vehicle to enforce
the fourth amendment rights now enjoyed by schoolchildren. It is hoped that the
reader will acquire an understanding of the practical implications of what the Court
did, and failed to do, in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
II. New Jersey v. T.L.O.
A. T.L.O.'s Dilemma
On March 7, 1980, a teacher at a New Jersey high school discovered two girls
smoking cigarettes in a school restroom.' 3 The teacher escorted the two girls to the
principal's office, where they were questioned by the assistant vice principal,
Theodore Choplick. 14 In response to questioning, one girl admitted that she had been
smoking.15 The other girl, identified only as T.L.O., denied that she had been
smoking in the lavatory and claimed that she did not smoke at all.16
Choplick asked T.L.O. to come into his office and demanded to see the contents
of her purse.17 Opening the purse, he found a pack of cigarettes and a package of
cigarette rolling papers. 18 Recognizing the latter to be closely associated with
marijuana use, Choplick proceeded to search the purse thoroughly. 19 The search
revealed a small quantity of marijuana and various other drug-related paraphernalia. 20
T.L.O. was taken to police headquarters, where she confessed to selling marijuana at
school. 2' The state then brought delinquency charges against her.22
9. See supra note 7 and cases cited therein.
10. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961); weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914). See generally MCCORMICK ON EviCDEc §§ 164-83 (3d ed. 1984).
11. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
12. See, e.g., Bernstein, Supreme Court Review, TRIAL, Ap. 1985 at 14, 15; Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 5, at
527-49 (1985); Reamey, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Supreme Court's Lesson on School Searches, 16 ST. MAY's L.J.
933-49 (1985); The Supreme Court. 1984 Term, 99 HAzv. L. Rav. 120, 233-43 (1985); Comment, New Jersey v. T.L.O.:
Finding a Reasonable Standard for Searches in Public Schools, 12 W. ST. U.L. REv. 873-80 (1985).
13. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 329.
22. Id.
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B. T.L.O. and the Wheels of Justice
In the juvenile and domestic relations court of Middlesex County, T.L.O.
argued that Choplick's search of her purse violated the fourth amendment, 23 and
moved to suppress both the evidence and her confession which, she contended, was
tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. 24 The juvenile court concluded that,
although the fourth amendment applies to searches carried out by school officials, 25
Choplick's search was reasonable. 26 The court consequently denied T.L.O.'s motion
to suppress. 27 The court ultimately found T.L.O. to be a delinquent and sentenced her
to one year's probation. 28
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's finding that there had been no
fourth amendment violation29 and T.L.O. appealed. The New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the search was violative of the fourth amendment. 30 The court
viewed Choplick's initial decision to open the purse as unjustified since mere
possession of cigarettes did not violate school rules. 31 Choplick's secondary, more
thorough search was also unreasonable inasmuch as mere possession of cigarette
rolling papers did not justify the extensive "rummaging" through T.L.O.'s purse. 32
The New Jersey court then applied the exclusionary rule to bar the admission of this
evidence. 33 The State of New Jersey appealed and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
C. The T.L.O. Standard
The Supreme Court first determined that the fourth amendment's protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to regulate the activities of public
school officials. 34 The State of New Jersey argued that the fourth amendment applies
only to searches conducted by law enforcement officials. 35 The Court rejected this
argument, stating that, although the fourth amendment initially was directed at the
activities of law enforcement authorities, its basic purpose is to safeguard individual
privacy rights against arbitrary invasions by state agents.36 The Court also rejected
the position taken by several lower courts that school officials exercise special
quasi-parental authority over schoolchildren, and thus are exempt from the strictures
of the fourth amendment. 37 The Court observed that "public school officials do not
23. State ex rel. T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 335, 428 A.2d 1327, 1330 (1980).
24. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 329 (1985).
25. State ex rel. T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 340, 428 A.2d 1327, 1333 (1980).
26. Id. at 342-43, 428 A.2d at 1334.
27. Id. at 345, 428 A.2d at 1336.
28. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 330 (1985).
29. State ex rel. T.L.O., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A.2d 493 (1982).
30. State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983).
31. Id. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942-43.
32. Id. at 348, 463 A.2d at 943.
33. Id. at 349-50, 463 A.2d at 943-44.
34. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985).
35. Id. at 334.
36. Id. at 335 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
37. The Court rejected the argument that school officials act in locoparentis with respect to students. This doctrine
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merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather,
they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies.' '38
Public school officials are state agents, not surrogate parents, and thus are bound by
the fourth amendment. 39
Turning to the standards applicable in the school search setting, the Court
emphasized the need to balance competing interests: the student's legitimate
expectations of privacy and personal security against the school's need for effective
methods to deal with breaches of order.40 This balance "does not require strict
adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause. . . .Rather,
the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness,
under all the circumstances, of the search.' 41
The Court adopted a two-fold inquiry to determine the reasonableness of any
such search: (1) Was the action "justified at its inception;" 42 and (2) Was the search
as actually conducted "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place." 4 3 The Court elaborated on this standard
by stating:
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will
be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the
rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted
are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light
of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.-
Applying this standard to the facts, the Court stated that the assistant vice
principal's decision to open T.L.O.'s purse was "justified at its inception" since he
had received a report that she was smoking in the restroom. 45 This report provided
Choplick with reasonable grounds to believe that T.L.O.'s purse contained ciga-
rettes. 46 Choplick's more thorough search of the purse was justified in scope since he
had a reasonable basis, after finding the cigarette rolling papers, to believe that
T.L.O. was involved in drug-related activity.47 Thus, the Court concluded that
Choplick's conduct was reasonable in all respects, and that the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision to exclude the evidence on fourth amendment grounds was therefore
erroneous.
48
states that because school officials derive their authority from the parent instead of the state, the school authorities, like
parents, are not subject to the constraints of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1982); In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969). See also Reaney, supra note 12, at 936;
Comment, supra note 12, at 874-75.
38. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
39. Id. at 336-37.
40. Id. at 337.
41. Id. at 341.
42. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 341-42 (footnotes omitted).
45. Id. at 345.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 347.
48. Id. at 347-48.
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D. The T.L.O. Standard: An Evaluation
The Court properly concluded that the fourth amendment applies in the
schoolhouse search context inasmuch as it speaks in general terms of the "right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects .... ,,49 This
language does not exempt schoolchildren from enjoyment of these rights. The fourth
amendment is a prohibition against arbitrary governmental invasions of privacy;50 no
exception is made for the activities of public school officials. Moreover, as the Court
indicates, teachers and other school officials are bound by the commands of the first
amendment 5' and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 2 In light of
these precedents, it would be somewhat anomalous to argue that school officials are
exempt from the fourth amendment.
The Court dispensed with the warrant requirement in this setting.5 3 It is difficult
to argue with this conclusion since the fourth amendment, strictly speaking, does not
require a warrant in this, or any other, context. 54 Rather, the determination of those
situations which require a warrant has long been a subject of judicial interpretation,
and as Justice Brennan indicates, warrantless searches are permitted when the press
of time makes obtaining a warrant impractical. 55 The schoolhouse search situation
would appear to fall within this category since a swift response to student misconduct
often is needed to maintain a proper educational atmosphere.5 6 As Justice Blackmun
noted, "[s]uch immediate action obviously would not be possible if a teacher were
required to secure a warrant before searching a student." 5 7 Moreover, school officials
are simply unfamiliar with the complexities involved in securing a warrant; requiring
a warrant would be unduly burdensome to school authorities whose job is not to
obtain search warrants but to educate the youth of this nation.
The Court also dispensed with the probable cause requirement in this context.58
In its place, the majority substituted the less stringent Terry v. Ohio59 reasonableness
standard to determine the validity of searches conducted by school authorities. 60 The
majority states that its approach has the advantage of permitting school officials "to
regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense." 61 Justice
Brennan is quite critical of this approach, contending that it is vague and, rather than
providing guidance to school officials, "will likely spawn increased litigation and
49. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
50. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
51. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
52. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)).
53. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
54. U.S. Cossr. amend. IV.
55. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 356 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
also Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 537 n.55.
56. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 352-53 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. Id. at 353.
58. Id. at 341.
59. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also supra notes 7 and 9 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 42 and 43 and accompanying text.
61. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985).
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greater uncertainty among teachers and administrators." 62 He argues instead for the
imposition of the more exacting probable cause standard in this situation. 63
In fairness, neither the majority's reasonableness approach nor Brennan's
probable cause standard is free of ambiguity. School authorities, after all, are not law
enforcement officials and are not sophisticated in the intricacies of either concept. But
the majority's analysis overlooks several crucial factors which suggest that the
probable cause standard may be more appropriate in this context.
First, it is unclear whether the majority's approach actually provides students any
meaningful protection against the activities of school officials. It is true that the
majority's standard prohibits searches absent reasonable suspicion, but, as one com-
mentator has observed, "reasonable suspicion is really intuitive, a guess, something
slightly above a hunch. ' '6 4 In T.L.O., for example, the Court validated a search based
upon an apparent "hunch" that T.L.O.'s purse contained cigarettes. Choplick, after
all, had no substantive basis to believe that T.L.O.'s purse contained cigarettes. He
simply "guessed" correctly; this fortuitous event led to the discovery of marijuana.
Moreover, Choplick had no need to search T.L.O.'s purse since, presumably, the
teacher's report that she had been smoking would be sufficient evidence to discipline
her. If school officials are permitted to conduct unnecessary searches based upon a
"guess" or a "hunch," then student privacy rights become illusory.
Second, the majority's standard fails to adequately advise school officials as to
when they may lawfully undertake a search. The majority states that its approach will
"spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in
the niceties of probable cause.' '65 But the majority overlooks the fact that its standard
requires school officials to educate themselves in the niceties of reasonableness. This
will be particularly difficult in light of the majority's failure to clearly define
reasonableness. The probable cause standard, by contrast, is a fairly well-defined
legal concept as evidenced by the many decisions delineating its contours.66 Justice
Brennan argues that a school system could consult these "decisions and other legal
materials and prepare a booklet expounding the rough outlines of the concept. Such
a booklet could be distributed to teachers to provide them with guidance as to when
a search may be lawfully conducted.''67 The majority simply ignores this logical
suggestion and expounds a standard which, at best, provides little guidance to school
officials.
62. Id. at 365. Justice Stevens also disagrees with the majority's standard. In his separate opinion, Justice Stevens
espouses a reasonableness approach, but his test takes a somewhat different form. Stevens advances a standard that will
permit searches of students when there is reasonable cause to believe that a student is engaged in criminal wrongdoing
or activity "seriously disruptive of school order, or the educational process." Id. at 378 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
63. Id. at 368.
64. Bernstein, supra note 12, at 15.
65. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985).
66. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Seegenerally McCop.wo.ON EvIDNcEr
§ 170 (3d ed. 1984).
67. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 365-66 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Third, the majority mistakenly views the probable cause standard as unworkable
in the schoolhouse search situation. This view runs counter to that expressed by the
Court in Illinois v. Gates,68 in which, Justice Brennan notes, the probable cause
standard was described as "'practical,' 'fluid,' 'flexible,' 'easily applied,' and
'nontechnical.' 69 Moreover, teachers and school administrator s are a generally
well-educated group, which, with a minimal amount of instruction, would appear
quite capable of comprehending and administering this "nontechnical" standard.
Finally, as Justice Brennan argues, the majority's approach is a substantial
deviation from well-settled fourth amendment doctrine. 70 Justice Brennan's argument
is fairly straightforward: full-scale searches are not permitted absent a showing of
probable cause;7t Choplick's "thorough excavation of T.L.O.'s purse" 72 constituted
a full-scale search; 73 hence, the probable cause standard is applicable in this context.
This position is well-taken. The search of T.L.O.'s purse would not seem to fall
within the Terry v. Ohio74 line of cases given Choplick's extensive "rummaging" 75
through the purse. 76 The majority simply ignores this fact and creates an
entirely new category of fourth amendment law. This new category permits school
officials to conduct searches based upon a reasonable suspicion when the scope of any
such inquiry is not "excessively intrusive. '" 77 Precisely what constitutes an "exces-
sively intrusive" search is unclear and further litigation will undoubtedly be
necessary to define the contours of this vague new category of fourth amendment law.
In short, the majority, in casting aside the probable cause standard, may have
rendered student privacy interests a nullity and unnecessarily muddled fourth
amendment search and seizure law. In so doing, the majority, rather than providing
guidance to school officials, has invited more litigation.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the probable cause approach is the more
appropriate standard in this context. Imposing the probable cause standard in the
schoolhouse search situation poses some difficulties, but these difficulties are not
insurmountable. With a minimal amount of instruction, school officials will possess
sufficient knowledge to maintain order and preserve student privacy rights.
E. T.L.O.'s Impact
It is difficult to gauge the overall importance of this decision. As the Court
indicates, the majority of lower courts to consider the appropriate standards which
should govern the search of a student by a school official have adopted a
68. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
69. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 364 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, citing
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 236, 239, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983)).
70. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 358 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 355.
73. Id.
74. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
75. See supra text accompanying note 32.
76. See supra notes 7 and 9. The Terry line of cases permits only limited, minimally instrusive searches.
77. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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reasonableness approach. 78 Hence, the impact of the T.L.O. decision may be quite
minimal. 79
The most significant aspect of the Court's opinion centers on the several issues
it leaves unresolved. The case did not involve the search of a student's locker, desk,
or other school property. 80 Accordingly, the Court did not express an opinion as to
the standards governing the search of such areas. 81 Similarly, the police were not
involved in the search of T.L.O.'s purse; hence, no opinion was expressed as to the
standards governing the search of a student by law enforcement officials. 82 Further,
the Court did not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of
the reasonableness standard it adopted for searches by school officials. 83 That is,
when a school authority has reasonable grounds to suspect wrongdoing by students,
may the authority conduct a search of all students or only those particular individual
students suspected? The T.L.O. decision offers no answer. The Court also did not
address the standards governing the use of drug-detecting dogs, strip searches, "or
what rules would be applicable to a school search case if it were decided by a state
court on 'independent state grounds' under the state's constitution or statutes."8 4 The
final, and perhaps most significant, issue left unresolved by the Court involves the
role of the exclusionary rule in school search cases. 85 The balance of this Comment
will examine the propriety of the exclusionary rule as a mechanism to enforce student
fourth amendment rights.
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN SCHOOL SEARCHES
At common law, the means by which law enforcement authorities obtained
evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution had no bearing on its admissibility.8 6
In response to the perceived shortcomings of this doctrine, the Supreme Court, in
Weeks v. United States,87 held that evidence seized in violation of the fourth
amendment was inadmissible in a federal criminal prosecution. 88 The fourth
amendment's so-called "exclusionary rule" was thus born. 89 In Wolf v. Colorado,9°
78. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 429 U.S. 325, 332-33 n.2 (1985). See also Comment, supra note 12, at 879.
79. See Comment, supra note 12, at 879. This conclusion is further corroborated by a nationwide survey of schools
conducted by Professors Hogan and Schwartz which indicated that the vast majority of school systems already use a
reasonableness standard. See Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 544-45.
80. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 n.5 (1985). See also Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 533 n.36.
81. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,337 n.5 (1985). See also Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 533 n.36.
82. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985). See also Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 533 n.36.
83. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985). See also Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 533 n.36.
84. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 533 n.36.
85. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 n.3 (1985). See also Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 533 n.36.
86. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 467 (1928); State v. Hunt, 280 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Mo. 1955); State
v. McGee, 214 N.C. 184-85, 198 S.E. 616-17 (1938); Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380 Pa. 532, 535, 112 A.2d 379, 381,
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 829 (1955); State v. Olynik, 83 R.I. 31, 34, 113 A.2d 123, 125 (1955). See also McCoecK oN
EviENcE § 165 (3d ed. 1984).
87. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
88. Id. at 398.
89. The exclusionary rule is not limited to fourth amendment violations; rather, it has been used to bar the
admission of evidence seized in violation of both the fifth and sixth amendments. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See generally MCCosecK o.
Evmucs §§ 150, 155 (3d ed. 1984).
90. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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decided in 1949, the Court declined to impose the exclusionary rule on the states as
a matter of fourteenth amendment due process. 91 Twelve years later, in Mapp v.
Ohio,92 the Court abruptly reversed the Wo/f decision and imposed the exclusionary
rule upon the states. 93 Thus, as a general matter, the exclusionary rule bars the
admission in federal and state criminal prosecutions of all evidence seized in violation
of the fourth amendment. 94
Since Mapp, the Court has been confronted with the often difficult task of
defining the ambit of the exclusionary rule. As a general matter, the Court has
narrowed the scope of the Mapp decision in recent years. 95 But, despite these
constrictions, the exclusionary rule continues to be the primary vehicle by which
fourth amendment rights are enforced. 96
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment applies to safeguard the privacy rights of schoolchildren against the
activities of school officials. 97 But the Court failed to define the role of the
exclusionary rule as a tool to enforce these rights. The issue may be framed as
follows: If evidence of student wrongdoing has been discovered by school authorities
in the course of an unconstitutional search, does the exclusionary rule bar the
admission of this evidence in a criminal prosecution brought against the student?
A. T.L.O.'s Reargument
The New Jersey Supreme Court answered the above question in the affirma-
tive, 98 stating that "if an official search violates constitutional rights, the evidence is
not admissible in criminal proceedings. ' ' 99
The United States Supreme Court initially granted certiorari to review this
aspect of the T.L.O. case. l °0 The Court then ordered reargument of the case on the
issue of what limits, if any, the fourth amendment places on the activities of school
authorities.' 0' Concluding that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable and
therefore lawful, the Court did not reach the issue of the exclusionary rule's
application to unlawful searches conducted by school officials. 102 Consequently, one
91. Id. at 33.
92. 367 U.S. 643, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961).
93. Id. at 655.
94. For a more detailed discussion of the origins and development of the exclusionary rule, see Stewart, The Road
to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search.and-Seizure
Cases, 83 Cottu.. L. Rsv. 1365, 1372-80 (1983).
95. See. e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, reh'g denied,
468 U.S. 1250 (1984); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980); Michigan v.
Defillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965).
96. Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 238 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
97. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
98. State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 341-42, 463 A.2d 934, 939 (1983).
99. Id. (footnote omitted).
100. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1985).
101. Id. at 332.
102. Id. at 332-33. In his separate opinion, Justice Stevens criticizes the Court for failing to reach this issue.
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must look initially to the lower courts in an attempt to glean an answer to this
question. 103
B. The Cases
Although few have considered the question, a minority of courts appear to have
adopted the view that the exclusionary rule does not require the suppression of
evidence unconstitutionally seized by teachers and other school authorities.o4 This
section will examine three cases which have adopted this position.
In United States v. Coles, 10 5 the District Court for the Northern District of Maine
ruled that the exclusionary rule does not bar, in a criminal prosecution, the admission
of marijuana seized from a student's suitcase by an administrative officer of a federal
job training center. 106 The Coles court stated that the official's search was lawful, but
even assuming it was not, the student nonetheless could not invoke the exclusionary
rule in this situation. '0 7 As a basis for its decision, the court noted that no court has
ever extended the exclusionary rule "so far as to hold that the Fourth Amendment
requires the exclusion of evidence obtained through a search in which there was no
participation or instigation by a federal or state law enforcement officer."' 0 8 The
court rationalized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is "to discourage police
misconduct," 0 9 and subjecting persons other than law enforcement personnel to the
rule would have no impact on improving standards of police conduct.1 10 Therefore,
under this rationale, the exclusionary rule has no application unless law enforcement
officials are involved.
Similarly, in 1975, in State v. Young,"' a student sought suppression of
marijuana which had been seized from his person by an assistant principal, claiming
that the search violated the fourth amendment. 112 The Georgia Supreme Court agreed
with the Coles court, holding that, even if the search was unlawful, the exclusionary
rule applied only to unconstitutional searches conducted by law enforcement
officials."l 3 The Georgia court divided the potentialities into three groups: (1) private
persons for whom neither the fourth amendment nor the exclusionary rule apply;
Stevens, along with Justices Brennan and Marshall, believes that the exclusionary rule is applicable in schoolhouse search
cases. Id. at 371-75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. This Comment will consider only those cases which have ruled on the issue of the exclusionary rule's
application to unlawful searches conducted by school officials acting alone. This case overview also is limited to those
cases which have ruled on this issue without resorting to the doctrine of in loco parentis, which was rejected by the Court
in T.L.O. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (N.D.
Me. 1969); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975); State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S.E.2d 51
(1976).
105. 302 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Me. 1969).
106. Id. at 103.
107. Id. at 102.
108. Id. at 103 (footnote omitted). Cases decided subsequent to Coles have held the exclusionary rule applicable
when neither federal nor state law enforcement agents were involved. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. See
also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
109. United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99, 103 (N.D. Me. 1969).
110. Id.
111. 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975).
112. Id. at 488, 216 S.E.2d at 588.
113. Id. at 489, 216 S.E.2d at 589.
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(2) governmental agents, including public school officials, for whom the fourth
amendment applies but the exclusionary rule does not; and (3) governmental law
enforcement agents for whom both the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule
apply."14 The Georgia court noted that, if teachers or other school authorities violate
a student's constitutional rights, the student's remedy is to seek civil damages rather
than excluding the evidence. 115
In a third case, Bellnier v. Lund,"16 school officials strip searched an entire
classroom of students in search of three dollars of missing money."t 7 The students,
through their parents, brought a civil rights action against the school." 8 Although the
exclusionary rule was not at issue in this case, the District Court for the Northern
District of New York indicated that the exclusionary rule would not be the appropriate
remedy for a student who had been subjected to an unlawful search by a school
official." 9 The court adopted the Young court's analysis and stated that a student's
recourse in this context was to seek a civil damage remedy. 120 The court declined,
however, to award money damages in this case in light of the good faith immunity
enjoyed by school officials under the doctrine of Wood v. Strickland. 121
The view espoused by the Coles, Young and Bellnier courts is seriously flawed
in two significant respects. These courts expound the idea that the exclusionary rule
has no application unless the searching party is a police officer. 122 But this position
is simply inaccurate in light of the Mapp decision, which states that "all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is ... inadmissible
in a [federal or state criminal prosecution]."1 23 This command is not restricted to the
activities of police officers; rather, it requires suppression of all evidence unlawfully
seized by any person subject to the strictures of the fourth amendment. In T.L.O., the
Supreme Court stated that school officials are state agents and as such are bound by
the fourth amendment. 124 Thus, a combination of Mapp and T.L. 0. would seem to
require the suppression of evidence unconstitutionally seized by school officials.
The second major flaw in the minority position involves its failure to provide a
remedy to students who have been subjected to an unlawful search by a school
official. The Young court stated that, when evidence of student wrongdoing has been
discovered by school officials while conducting an unlawful search, the student
cannot have the evidence excluded from a criminal prosecution but must seek a civil
damage remedy.12 5 The Bellnier court, on the other hand, disallowed a monetary
award in a similar situation because school officials enjoy a good faith immunity from
114. Id. at 493-94, 216 S.E.2d at 591.
115. Id. at 494, 216 S.E.2d at 591.
116. 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
117. Id. at 50.
118. Id. at 49.
119. Id. at 53.
120. Id.
121. 420 U.S. 308, reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975). The doctrine of Wood v. Strickland restricts the availability
of damages to actions against those school officials who act in bad faith. Id. at 322.
122. See supra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
123. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961)(emphasis added).
124. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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civil damages.1 26 The minority view thus works to deny recourse to a student whose
fourth amendment rights have been violated. In T.L.O., the Supreme Court
recognized that students possess privacy rights which are protected by the fourth
amendment, 27 but the minority view fails to provide a mechanism to enforce these
rights. Simply stated, unenforceable fourth amendment rights are, in reality, no rights
at all; they are worthless.
An apparent majority of courts, by contrast, have adopted the position that the
exclusionary rule requires the suppression of evidence unlawfully seized from
students by school authorities.128 Although this author agrees with the position taken
by these courts, the opinions have, for the most part, simply assumed that the
exclusionary rule applies in this context.129 Hence, these cases will not be examined
in detail. Instead, this Comment will explore the three major policy bases which
underlie the existence of the exclusionary rule and apply these policies to the
schoolhouse search situation in an attempt to further illustrate why the exclusionary
rule should apply in this context.
C. The Policy Bases of the Exclusionary Rule
1. Deterrence
The most prevalent modem-day justification for the existence of the exclusion-
ary rule is the desire to deter law enforcement officials from engaging in unconsti-
tutional searches.' 30 It is argued that the exclusionary rule accomplishes this by
rendering unlawfully obtained evidence inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. 131
The extent to which the exclusionary rule actually deters police misconduct has been
126. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., People v. J.A., 85 111. App. 3d 567, 406 N.E.2d 958 (1980); State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.
1975), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983); State
v. Engerud, 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983); People v. D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 315 N.E.2d 466
(1974); People v. Bowers, 72 Misc. 2d 800, 339 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1973), aff'd, 77 Misc. 2d 697, 356 N.Y.S.2d 432
(1974); State v. Walker, 19 Or. App. 420, 528 P.2d 113 (1974).
129. See supra note 128 and cases cited therein. For two well-written opinions applying the exclusionary rule to
school disciplinary proceedings, see Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980) and Smyth
v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (V.D. Mich. 1975).
130. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, reh'g denied,
468 U.S. 1250 (1984); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980); Michigan v.
Defillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
131. In recent years, a majority of the Supreme Court has employed a "cost-benefit" analysis to determine when
the exclusionary rule will apply. The majority's approach weighs the costs of excluding probative evidence against the
benefits of additional deterrence of official misconduct. If the costs are determined to outweigh the benefits, the
exclusionary rule is deemed inapplicable. For examples of the "cost-benefit" approach, see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984); United States v. Havens,
446 U.S. 620, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980); Michigan v. Defillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976);
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). For a criticism of the
"cost-benefit" approach, see Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest On A "'Principled Basis" Rather
Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CSEIGHroN L. Rv. 565 (1983).
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a subject of considerable controversy.1 32 But the deterrence basis remains the
principle justification for the existence of the exclusionary rule.
Applying the deterrence policy to the schoolhouse search situation, Professor
Yale Kamisar t33 has stated:
A teacher or school official may worry about a civil action, an angry parent, or group
of parents, and maybe even whether the evidence will be admissible in a school disciplinary
proceeding.... But,... a teacher or school administrator is not likely to be thinking very
much about a juvenile delinquency or a criminal proceeding, and his or her behavior is not
likely to be influenced very much by the inadmissibility of the evidence in such
proceedings. 13
Therefore, if one accepts the deterrence basis as the sine qua non of the exclusionary
rule, as Kamisar theorizes a majority of the Supreme Court believes, then a strong
argument can be made that the exclusionary rule should not apply in the schoolhouse
search context since its deterrent value is quite weak.' 35
While having students stand trial may not be preeminent in the minds of school
officials, it is this author's view that school authorities will be deterred from engaging
in unconstitutional conduct by application of the exclusionary rule. With widespread
drug abuse and increased instances of violent crime currently plaguing American
schools, teachers and other school authorities have a keen interest in obtaining the just
punishment of those students who engage in such activities. Given this motivation,
it seems unlikely that a teacher would engage in an unlawful search knowing that such
conduct could jeopardize, if not preclude, the punishment of a wayward student.
At minimum, application of the rule will promote systemic obedience to the
Supreme Court's T.L.O. decision. Justice Brennan has argued that the exclusionary
rule is not designed to punish individual officials for their failure to obey the dictates
of the fourth amendment; rather, its chief deterrent function is to encourage
institutional compliance with the fourth amendment.136 The exclusionary rule, if
applied in this setting, will encourage school boards to establish procedures whereby
teachers are guided to act in compliance with the T.L.O. decision. Once school
officials possess this knowledge, they will be inclined to regulate their conduct
according to the training they have received, and the exclusionary rule's overall
deterrent function will be fulfilled.
132. See, e.g., Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous
Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974); Kamisar, Does the Exclusionary Rule Affect Police Behavior?, 62 JUoICAlnRE 70
(1978); Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest On A "Principled Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical
Proposition"?, 16 CRMEGHr N L. R~v. 565 (1983); Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement, 44
Tx. L. REV. 939 (1966); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. Ra,. 665 (1970);
Spector, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora's Problems For the Prosecutor, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 4 (1962); Spiotto, Search and
Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL SitD. 243 (1973).
133. Henry K. Ransom Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
134. Speech by Professor Yale Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Constitutional Law Conference in Washington, D.C.
(Sept. 13-14, 1985), cited in 54 U.S.L.W. 2199, 2200 (Oct. 15, 1985).
135. Id. at 2200.
136. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 953 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Stewart, supra note 94,
at 1400.
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In short, it is unlikely that application of the rule will deter every school official
from engaging in an unlawful search, but the rule will further the goal of educating
school authorities as to when a lawful search may be undertaken. In this context, the
rule will promote greater awareness, and hence fewer violations, of student privacy
rights.
2. Judicial Integrity
A second major policy justification for the existence of the exclusionary rule is
the so-called "imperative of judicial integrity." 137 This concept embodies the notion
that it is wrong in itself for a court to sanction the use of evidence that has been
unlawfully seized, or to use Justice Stewart's words, the "federal courts [should not]
be accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to
uphold." 138 If courts permit "official lawlessness" by allowing the state's use of
tainted evidence, they risk the loss of public support and invite disrespect and
anarchy. 139
Applying the judicial integrity concept to the schoolhouse context presents an
especially compelling reason why the exclusionary rule should bar the admission of
evidence illegally seized by school authorities. From an early age, schoolchildren are
taught to respect legal institutions and view the courts as paragons of virtue and
fairness. In order to foster and sustain this respect, it is imperative that students not
be denied basic constitutional protections by the courts when evidence has been
improperly obtained. Students must be shown that, in fact, a court will not sanction
misconduct-especially official misconduct. If a court tolerates official lawlessness
by allowing the use of tainted evidence seized by a school authority, students "cannot
help but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly," 140 and their once well-founded
respect for the judiciary may be forever lost.
3. Equity
A third policy basis underlying the existence of the exclusionary rule, and one
that parallels the judicial integrity justification, is the equitable notion that the
government should not profit from its own wrongdoing. 14 1 This policy is aimed at
137. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
138. Stewart, supra note 94, at 1382 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960)).
139. The origins of this principle can be found in numerous Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 648, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 223 (1960); Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). The extent to which the "judicial integrity" doctrine
remains a viable policy consideration in exclusionary rule litigation is unclear in light of the majority's seemingly
complete reliance on the deterrence rationale. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
140. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373-74 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)(footnote omitted).
141. The roots of this policy basis also can be found in several Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469, 471 (1928) (Holmes & Brandeis, J.J., dissenting); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 391-92, 394 (1914). See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). As
with the judicial integrity doctrine, it is unclear how much weight this policy is currently given by a majority of the Court.
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maintaining public trust in government.142 It is argued that the government, having
discovered evidence while conducting an unlawful search, should not be permitted to
benefit from its own lawless behavior by using the tainted evidence. 43 Justice
Brandeis captured the essence of this argument when he stated:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled [sic] if it fails
to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.'44
Much like the judicial integrity doctrine, this policy basis is applicable in
schoolhouse search cases as well. As Justice Brennan has observed, "[s]chools
cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship when the school
authorities themselves disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our consti-
tutional freedoms."145 American schools seek to inculcate children with the vital
necessity of obeying the law and the rules of the school. It is incongruous to expect
schoolchildren to obey the law when teachers openly flaunt the law by engaging in
unlawful searches without consequences.
This section has examined the three major policy bases which justify the
existence of the exclusionary rule as a vehicle to enforce the freedoms guaranteed by
the fourth amendment and has discussed the application of these policy bases in the
schoolhouse search setting. Based on the foregoing analysis, it is this author's
assertion that the exclusionary rule should bar the use of evidence unlawfully
obtained by school authorities in a criminal prosecution brought against a student.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has discussed the Supreme Court's decision in New Jersey v.
T.L.O., where the Court determined, in part, the extent to which public school
officials are bound by the fourth amendment. Although "the Court's extension of
Fourth Amendment protection to students is comforting," 146 the standard adopted to
govern schoolhouse searches is open to criticism. The majority's standard it fails to
provide students with any substantive protection against the activities of overzealous
school authorities. Moreover, the majority's approach has provided little, if any,
guidance to school officials and has unnecessarily muddled fourth amendment search
and seizure law. For these reasons, the probable cause standard is the more workable
approach in this context, in that it not only affords students greater protection against
overly eager school officials, but it also provides school authorities far greater
guidance as to when a lawful search may be undertaken.
This Comment also has explored the propriety of the exclusionary rule as a
vehicle to enforce student fourth amendment rights. Application of the rule in this
142. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. Id.
144. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
145. Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1028 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
146. Bernstein, supra note 12, at 15.
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setting is consistent with, if not mandated by, the Mapp decision and will provide a
remedy to students who have been subjected to an unlawful search by a school
official. In addition, application of the rule in schoolhouse search cases will deter
unconstitutional conduct by school officials, maintain student respect for the
judiciary, and prohibit school authorities from profiting from their own lawlessness.
As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."' 147
Imposition of the probable cause standard combined with use of the exclusionary rule
will provide students with no greater rights than they are entitled to under the
Constitution.
Charles W. Hardin, Jr.
147. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
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